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Abstract
Though deep neural networks have achieved sig-
nificant progress on various tasks, often enhanced
by model ensemble, existing high-performance
models can be vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
Many efforts have been devoted to enhancing the
robustness of individual networks and then con-
structing a straightforward ensemble, e.g., by di-
rectly averaging the outputs, which ignores the
interaction among networks. This paper presents
a new method that explores the interaction among
individual networks to improve robustness for en-
semble models. Technically, we define a new
notion of ensemble diversity in the adversarial
setting as the diversity among non-maximal pre-
dictions of individual members, and present an
adaptive diversity promoting (ADP) regularizer to
encourage the diversity, which leads to globally
better robustness for the ensemble by making ad-
versarial examples difficult to transfer among indi-
vidual members. Our method is computationally
efficient and compatible with the defense methods
acting on individual networks. Empirical results
on various datasets verify that our method can
improve adversarial robustness while maintaining
state-of-the-art accuracy on normal examples.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have recently achieved sig-
nificant progress in many tasks, such as image classi-
fication (Russakovsky et al., 2015) and speech recogni-
tion (Graves & Jaitly, 2014). However, they are not prob-
lemless. Recent work has shown that high-performance
classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial attacks (Goodfel-
low et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016b; Carlini & Wagner,
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2017b; Athalye et al., 2018), where images with human
imperceptible perturbations (i.e., adversarial examples) can
be generated to fool the classifiers. To improve the adver-
sarial robustness of classifiers, various kinds of defenses
have been proposed (Kurakin et al., 2017b; 2018a; Kan-
nan et al., 2018), and one practically effective strategy is
to construct ensembles of the enhanced networks to obtain
stronger defenses (Liao et al., 2018; Kurakin et al., 2018b).
However, most of these defense strategies focus on enhanc-
ing an individual network, while ignoring the potentially
very informative interactions among multiple models. As
widely observed, adversarial examples can have strong trans-
ferability among models (Papernot et al., 2016a; Kurakin
et al., 2018b). When training an ensemble model, the igno-
rance of interaction among individual members may lead
them to return similar predictions or feature representa-
tions (Dauphin et al., 2014; Li et al., 2016). Since it is
easier for adversarial examples to transfer among similar
models, it is probable for the adversarial examples crafted
for one individual member to also fool other members, or
even fool the whole ensemble model (See experiments).
Previous work has shown that for a single network, promot-
ing the diversity among learned features of different classes
can improve adversarial robustness (Pang et al., 2018a;b).
In this paper, we propose to improve adversarial robustness
from a new perspective by promoting the diversity among
the predictions returned by different members of an ensem-
ble, called ensemble diversity. Our approach is orthogonal
to other defenses acting on a single network and thus is
compatible with most of the previous defense methods.
Technically, we first develop a new notion of ensemble diver-
sity in the adversarial setting, which is significantly different
from the previous attempts in the standard setting of en-
sembling weak classifiers in a non-adversarial environment.
Namely, previous work has defined ensemble diversity by
considering the prediction errors of individual classifiers in
the ensemble (Liu & Yao, 1999a;b; Dietterich, 2000; Islam
et al., 2003). However, this definition is inappropriate for our
case since most DNNs can achieve high accuracy on a train-
ing set (Goodfellow et al., 2016) and promoting diversity of
prediction errors will largely sacrifice accuracy. Instead, we
define the diversity on the non-maximal predictions of each
network (detailed in Eq. (3)). Geometrically, the diversity
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Figure 1. Illustration of the ensemble diversity. Baseline: Individually training each member of the ensemble. ADP: Simultaneously
training all the members of the ensemble with the ADP regularizer. The left part of each panel is the normalized non-maximal predictions.
equals to the squared volume spanned by the normalized
non-maximal predictions, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Note that
promoting the diversity still allows the maximal prediction
of each network to be consistent with the true label, and thus
will not affect ensemble accuracy. Besides, since the non-
maximal predictions correspond to all potentially wrong
labels returned for the adversarial examples, a high diver-
sity or inconsistency on the non-maximal predictions of
individual networks can lower down the transferability of
adversarial examples among them, and further lead to better
robustness of the ensemble.
Under our definition of ensemble diversity, we propose to
promote the diversity using an adaptive diversity promot-
ing (ADP) regularizer. The ADP regularizer consists of
two terms—a logarithm of ensemble diversity (LED) term
and an ensemble entropy term. The ensemble entropy term
contains the Shannon entropy of ensemble predictions. In
Section 3.3, we prove that the ensemble entropy term is nec-
essary such that the LED term can properly encourage the
diversity. The ADP regularizer encourages the non-maximal
predictions of each member in the ensemble to be mutually
orthogonal, while keeping the maximal prediction be consis-
tent with the true label, as shown in Fig. 1 and theoretically
proved in Section 3.3. In the training procedure, we use the
ADP regularizer as the penalty term and train all the net-
works in the ensemble simultaneously and interactively on
the same dataset. This is called the ADP training procedure.
In experiments, we test our method under several widely
studied adversarial attacks introduced in Section 2.2 on
MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998), CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-
100 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009). The results show that
our method can significantly improve adversarial robustness
while maintaining state-of-the-art accuracy on normal exam-
ples. Although when performing back-propagation (Rumel-
hart et al., 1986) in the ADP training procedure, we need
to separately perform the operations det(G) and G−1 with
the computational complexity of O(K3), where K is the
number of members in the ensemble,K usually grows much
slower with the scale of problem (Russakovsky et al., 2015).
This enables our method to scale to most of the classification
tasks and avoid the computational obstacle caused by these
matrix operations as encountered in previous work (Kulesza
et al., 2012; Kwok & Adams, 2012; Mariet & Sra, 2016).
2. Preliminary Knowledge
In this section, we first define the notations, then briefly
introduce the adversarial attacks that we test in experiments.
2.1. Notations
We denote a deep neural network (DNN) classifier as
F (x, θ), where x is the input variable, and θ denotes all
the trainable parameters. Let L be the number of classes,
the output vector F (x, θ) ∈ RL represents a probability
distribution (Hereafter we will omit θ without ambiguity).
When training a classifier, one common objective function
is the cross-entropy (CE) loss defined as
LCE(x, y) = −1>y logF (x) = − logF (x)y ,
for an input-label pair (x, y). Here, 1y is the one-hot encod-
ing of y and the logarithm of a vector is defined as taking
logarithm of each element. Given a probability vector F , the
Shannon entropy is defined asH(F ) = −∑i Fi log(Fi).
2.2. The Adversarial Setting
Recent work shows that high-performance classifiers could
still be fooled by adversarial examples (Kurakin et al.,
2018b; Athalye et al., 2018). A generated adversarial exam-
ple x∗ is usually indistinguishable from its normal counter-
part x by a human observer. Here we introduce some of the
most commonly used attack methods as below:
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) crafts the adversarial example x∗ as x∗ = x +  ·
sign(∇xL(x, y)), where L(x, y) is the adversarial loss.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) (Kurakin et al., 2017a) iter-
atively crafts an adversarial example as x∗i = clipx,(x
∗
i−1+

r · sign(∇x∗i−1L(x∗i−1, y))). Here x∗0 = x, r is the number
of iteration steps and clipx,(·) is the clipping function.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2018)
has the same generation process as BIM, except for x∗0 is a
randomly perturbed image in the neighborhood U˚(x, ).
Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) (Dong et al., 2018)
won the NeurIPS 2017 Adversarial Competition (Kurakin
et al., 2018b), which is a variant of BIM. In each iteration,
MIM updates the gradient gi with momentum and crafts the
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adversarial example as x∗i = clipx,(x
∗
i−1 +

r · sign(gi))
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) (Papernot
et al., 2016b) perturbs one feature xi by  in each iteration
step that maximizes the saliency map
S(x, y)[i] =
{
0, if ∂F (x)y∂xi < 0 or
∑
j 6=y
∂F (x)j
∂xi
> 0,
(
∂F (x)y
∂xi
)
∣∣∣∑j 6=y ∂F (x)j∂xi ∣∣∣ ,otherwise.
The adversarial noise crafted by JSMA is often sparser, i.e.,
JSMA perturbs fewer pixels compared to other attacks.
Carlini & Wagner (C&W) (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) de-
fine x∗(ω) = 12 (tanh(ω) + 1) in terms of ω, and minimize
the objective function minω ‖x∗(ω)− x‖22 + c · f(x∗(ω)),
where c is a constant chosen by a modified binary search.
Let Spre(x) be the input vector of the softmax function in a
classifier, then f(·) is the objective function defined as
f(x) = max(max{Spre(x)i : i 6= y} − Spre(x)i,−κ),
where κ controls the confidence on adversarial examples.
Elastic-net Attack (EAD) (Chen et al., 2018) is a variant
of the C&W method, where the objective function becomes
minω ‖x∗(ω)−x‖22+β‖x∗(ω)−x‖1+c ·f(x∗(ω)). EAD
includes C&W as a special case when β = 0.
3. Methodology
In this section, we first introduce the training strategies for
ensemble models. Then we propose the adaptive diversity
promoting (ADP) training method, and provide theoretical
analyses on the optimal solutions of the ADP method.
3.1. Training Strategies for Ensemble Models
In real-world problems, ensembling several individual clas-
sifiers is usually effective to improve generalization perfor-
mance (Russakovsky et al., 2015). For clarity, we denote
the k-th member in the ensemble as F k ∈ RL, which repre-
sents the prediction of classifier k over L categories. Then
a common construction of the ensemble prediction F is a
simple average of all individual predictions as
F = 1
K
∑
k∈[K]
F k, (1)
where [K] := {1, · · · ,K}. There are three major strategies
for training ensembles, i.e., independent training, simultane-
ous training, and sequential training (Islam et al., 2003).
In independent training, each classifier F k is trained sepa-
rately, usually with the corresponding CE loss LkCE(x, y) :=
− logF k(x)y. Because of its simplicity, most of the deep
learning systems apply this strategy (Russakovsky et al.,
2015; Liao et al., 2018). However, one major disadvan-
tage of independent training is that it ignores the interaction
among the members in the ensemble. This ignorance may
lead to similar predictions or shared feature representations
among these members (Dauphin et al., 2014; Li et al., 2016),
which would not be useful to improve the performance of
the ensemble (Krogh & Vedelsby, 1995), and result in less
improvement on robustness as shown in our experiments.
In simultaneous training, all the classifiers are trained on the
same mini-batch of data in each training iteration. A naive
objective function for simultaneous training is the ensemble
cross-entropy (ECE) loss defined as
LECE =
∑
k∈[K]
LkCE , (2)
which is a simple sum of all individual cross-entropy losses.
Since the parameters for different networks are typically in-
dependent, simultaneously training all K networks with the
ECE loss is equivalent to independently training each classi-
fier with the corresponding CE loss. The learning rate for
each network could be different. If some networks converge
faster, then we can freeze the parameters of those converged
networks and continue training others. Simultaneous train-
ing scheme allows us to incorporate the interaction among
different members in the ensemble. Indeed, for large-scale
tasks, simultaneous training may require more GPU memory
or workers compared to independent training. However, it
does not require extra computation. When the computing re-
source is limited, sequential training can be applied instead,
which trains one network after another in each iteration.
In our method, we apply the simultaneous training scheme.
Namely, we combine a novel regularizer (introduced in
Eq. (5)) with the ECE loss term as the objective function
for training. By doing this, the members in the ensemble
can separately keep high accuracy since the ECE loss term,
while interacting with each other via our regularizer.
3.2. Adaptive Diversity Promoting Training
Previous work has shown that for a single network, promot-
ing the diversity among learned features of different classes
can improve adversarial robustness (Pang et al., 2018a;b). In
this paper, we promote diversity from another level, i.e., the
diversity among learned predictions of different members in
an ensemble, to improve robustness. This kind of diversity is
called ensemble diversity. The previous analysis states that
there is no strict definition of what is intuitively perceived
as ensemble diversity (Kuncheva & Whitaker, 2003) and
most of the previous work defines the ensemble diversity
concerning the prediction errors of individual classifiers in
the ensemble (Liu & Yao, 1999a;b; Dietterich, 2000; Islam
et al., 2003). This definition partly bases on the assumption
that each member in the ensemble is a weak classifier (Fried-
man et al., 2001). However, this assumption hardly holds
for the ensemble of DNNs nowadays, thus encouraging the
prediction errors of DNNs to be diverse is inappropriate and
will largely sacrifice the accuracy of them.
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In order to maintain the accuracy of each member in the
ensemble, the maximal prediction returned by each member
should be consistent with the true label. Therefore, in our
method, we define the ensemble diversity with respect to the
non-maximal predictions. For a single input pair (x, y) in
the training set, the maximal prediction should be consistent
with the true label y, and the non-maximal predictions corre-
spond to other labels except for y. Inspired by the theory of
the determinant point process (DPP) (Kulesza et al., 2012),
we define the ensemble diversity as
ED = det(M˜>\yM˜\y). (3)
Here M˜\y = (F˜ 1\y, · · · , F˜K\y) ∈ R(L−1)×K , each column
vector F˜ k\y ∈ RL−1 is obtained by normalizing F k\y under
L2-norm, where F k\y is the order preserving prediction of
the k-th classifier on x without the y-th element. According
to the matrix theory (Bernstein, 2005), we have:
det(M˜>\yM˜\y) = Vol
2({F˜ k\y}k∈[K]), (4)
where Vol(·) denotes the volume spanned by the vectors
of the input set. This provides an elegant geometric inter-
pretation for the ensemble diversity, as intuitively shown
in Fig. 1. Since F˜ k\y is normalized, i.e., ‖F˜ k\y‖2 = 1, the
ensemble diversity ED achieves its maximal value 1 if and
only if the column vectors of M˜\y are mutually orthogonal.
Note that most of the previous definitions of diversity, e.g.,
those defined on prediction errors, include the predictions
F ky on the true label y (Liu & Yao, 1999a;b; Islam et al.,
2003; Kuncheva & Whitaker, 2003). Since DNNs are no
longer weak classifiers in the most cases (Goodfellow et al.,
2016), encouraging F ky to be diverse may make the loss
on accuracy outweighs the gain for DNNs, or render the
convergence point of the training process uncontrollable.
In contrast, we define the diversity among the normalized
non-maximal predictions F˜ k\y, which allows the maximal
prediction of each network to be consistent with the true
label, and thus will not affect ensemble accuracy. What’s
more, promoting this diversity could improve robustness.
Because, in the adversarial setting, when the maximal pre-
diction corresponds to the true label y, the non-maximal
predictions correspond to the labels [L]\{y}, which include
all potentially wrong labels returned for the adversarial ex-
amples. Thus a high diversity or inconsistency on the non-
maximal predictions F k\y can lower down the transferability
of adversarial examples among the networks, and further
lead to better robustness of the ensemble.
To promote ensemble diversity, we propose the adaptive
diversity promoting (ADP) regularizer as
ADPα,β(x, y) = α · H(F) + β · log (ED) (5)
for a single input pair (x, y), where α, β ≥ 0 are two hy-
perparameters. Note that the ADP regularizer consists of
Algorithm 1 The ADP training procedure
Input: The K individual models {F k(x, θk)}k∈[K]; the
training dataset D = {(xi, yi)}i∈[N ].
Initialization: Initialize each θk as θk0 , the training step
counters as ck = 0, εk be the learning rate variables,
I = [K] be the indicator set, where k ∈ [K].
while I 6= ∅ do
Calculate the objective on a mini-batch of data Dm
LmADP =
1
|Dm|
∑
(xi,yi)∈Dm
[LECE − ADPα,β ] (xi, yi).
for k
′
in I do
Update θk
′
c+1 ← θk
′
c − εk′∇θk′LmADP
∣∣
{θkck}k∈[K]
.
Update ck′ ← ck′ + 1, where c = ck′ .
if θk
′
converges then Update I = I\{k′}.
end for
end while
Return: The parameters θk = θkck , where k ∈ [K].
two parts. The first part is the ensemble Shannon entropy
H(F), and the second part is the logarithm of the ensem-
ble diversity (LED), which we call as the LED part. More
technical details about the effects of these two parts and
why the ensemble entropy part is necessary will be deferred
to Section 3.3. The training procedure with the ADP regu-
larizer is called the ADP training method, as described in
Algorithm 1. Further analysis on other potential definition
of ensemble diversity is provided in Appendix B.1.
When performing back-propagation (Rumelhart et al., 1986)
in the ADP training procedure, we need to separately per-
form two matrix operations det(G) and G−1. Without
loss of generality, let G ∈ Rm×m, where m denote the
dimension of the matrix, these two operations both have
computational complexities of O(m3) under common algo-
rithms (Kulesza et al., 2012), which may cause computa-
tional obstacle if m scales comparably with the size of the
problem. For example, in previous DPP-based methods used
to sample diverse subsets (Kwok & Adams, 2012; Mariet
& Sra, 2016), they need to calculate the values of det(G)
to obtain the sampling probability for each subset, where
m usually scales with the number of classes or number of
hidden units in networks. However, in our method, we have
G = M˜>\yM˜\y and m = K, where K grows much slower
with the scale of problem (Russakovsky et al., 2015). This
property enables our method to scale to most of the mod-
ern machine learning tasks and avoid similar computational
obstacle encountered in previous work. As experimentally
shown in Section 4, our method is also compatible with
other defenses acting on individual networks, e.g., adversar-
ial training (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018),
and thus our method could be an orthogonal approach to
further improve robustness for ensemble models. These
results verify that ensemble diversity is indeed an effective
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component to consider when designing stronger defenses.
3.3. Theoretical Analyses on ADP Training
The minimization problem in the ADP training on a single
input-label pair (x, y) can be formally denoted as
min
θ
LECE − ADPα,β
s. t. 0 ≤ F kj ≤ 1,
∑
j∈[L]
F kj = 1,
(6)
where θ = {θk}k∈[K] denotes all the trainable parameters
in the ensemble. For multiple input-label pairs, the objective
function is simply a summation of each single function as in
Algorithm 1. However, to simplify the analysis, we focus on
the optimal solution in the space of output predictions F =
{F k}k∈[K], and assume that the representation capacity of
each network is unlimited (Hornik et al., 1989). Therefore,
we ignore the specific mapping from x to each F k, and
redefine the above minimization problem with respect to
F, rather than θ. Below we will theoretically analyze how
the values of the two hyperparameters α and β influence
the solution for the minimization problem. If α = 0, the
ADP regularizer degenerates to the LED part. In this case,
the solution will be one-hot vectors 1y just as there is no
regularizer, as shown in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. (Proof in Appendix A) If α = 0, then ∀β ≥ 0,
the optimal solution of the minimization problem (6) satisfies
the equations F k = 1y , where k ∈ [K].
The conclusion means that the LED part in the ADP reg-
ularizer cannot work alone without the ensemble entropy
part, indicating that the ensemble entropy part is necessary.
In a nutshell, this is because we define the LED part on the
normalized predictions F˜ k\y corresponding to untrue labels.
Thus the LED part can only affect the mutual angles of these
untrue predictions. The summation of all unnormalized un-
true predictions is 1− F ky , and in this case, the summation
will only be influenced by the ECE loss part, which leads
to one-hot optimal solution 1y . On the other hand, if β = 0,
the ADP regularizer degenerates to the ensemble entropy,
which results in similar optimal solutions on ensemble pre-
diction F as label smoothing (Szegedy et al., 2016). The
equivalent smoothing factor is 1−Fy , and the conclusions
are formally stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 2. (Proof in Appendix A) When α > 0 and β = 0,
the optimal solution of the minimization problem (6) satisfies
the equations F ky = Fy , F j = 1−FyL−1 and
1
Fy =
α
K
log
Fy(L− 1)
1−Fy , (7)
where k ∈ [K] and j ∈ [L]\{y}.
Here Eq. (7) can assist us in selecting proper values for
the hyperparameter α. For example, if we want to train
an ensemble of 5 individual networks (K = 5) on Ima-
geNet (L = 1000) with equivalent label smoothing factor
0.1 (Fy = 0.9), then we can calculate from Eq. (7) that
α ≈ 0.61. The difference of the solutions in Theorem 2
from those of label smoothing is that there is an extra con-
straint for each individual prediction: F ky = Fy. This
guarantees the consistency of all maximal predictions with
the true label. Besides, it is worthy to note that for any
j ∈ [L]\{y}, the ensemble entropy part does not directly
regularize on the non-maximal predictions F kj , but regular-
ize on their mean, i.e., the ensemble prediction F j . This
leaves degrees of freedom on the optimal solutions of F kj ,
and the effect of the LED part is to further regularize on
them: if L − 1 is divisible by K, i.e., K | (L − 1), the
non-maximal predictions of each network are mutually or-
thogonal, as intuitively shown in the right panel of Fig. 1,
where K = 3 and L = 10. We mathematically denote the
optimal solution in this case as in the following corollary:
Corollary 1. If there is K | (L − 1), then ∀α, β > 0, the
optimal solution of the minimization problem (6) satisfies the
Eq. (7). Besides, let S = {s1, , · · · , sK} be any partition of
the index set [L]\{y}, where ∀k ∈ [K], |sk| = L−1K . Then
the optimal solution further satisfies:
F kj =

K(1−Fy)
L−1 , j ∈ sk,
Fy , j = y,
0, otherwise.
(8)
The index subset sk includes all the indexes except for y
that the k-th classifier predicts non-zero probability. Note
that the partition S is adaptive concerning the input, which
means that for two inputs x1 and x2 of the same label y,
the partition S1 and S2 could be different. For example,
for dog image #1 and dog image #2, an individual network
may both assign 0.7 probability to label dog, and separately
assign 0.1 probability to labels car, frog, ship for image #1
and plane, truck, cat for image #2. This is why the ADP
regularizer is named as adaptive, and this adaptivity can
avoid imposing an artificial bias on the relationship among
different classes. When L is large, the optimal solution will
still approximately satisfy the conclusion if K - (L − 1).
As shown in Table 5 of our experiments, even when L is not
large (L = 10), the ADP method can still work well in the
case of K - (L− 1). After training by the ADP method, the
non-maximal predictions of each network will tend to be
mutually orthogonal, and further leads to different feature
distributions and decision domains as shown in Fig. 2, where
more technical details can be found in Section 4.2.
4. Experiments
We now provide the experimental results to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the ADP training on improving adversarial
robustness under different attack methods, while maintain-
ing state-of-the-art accuracy on normal examples.
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Figure 2. t-SNE visualization results on the final hidden features
of each individual network. The input is the test set of CIFAR-10.
4.1. Setup
We choose three widely studied datasets—MNIST, CIFAR-
10 and CIFAR-100 (LeCun et al., 1998; Krizhevsky & Hin-
ton, 2009). MNIST consists of grey images of handwritten
digits in classes 0 to 9, and CIFAR-10 consists of color
images in 10 different classes. CIFAR-100 is similar to
CIFAR-10 except that it has 100 classes. Each dataset
has 50,000 training images and 10,000 test images. The
pixel values of images are scaled to be in the interval [0, 1].
The normal examples in our experiments refer to all the
ones in the training and test sets. The code is available at
https://github.com/P2333/Adaptive-Diversity-Promoting.
4.2. Performance on Normal Examples
We first evaluate the performance in the normal setting. On
each dataset, we implement the ensemble model consisting
of three Resnet-20 networks (He et al., 2016), where K = 3
satisfies the condition K | (L − 1) for L = 10 and L =
100. In Section 4.6, we will investigate on the case when
K - (L − 1). Our baseline training method is to train the
ensemble with the ECE loss, which is equivalent to ADP
training with α = β = 0. As analyzed in Section 3.1,
simultaneously training all networks with the ECE loss is
also equivalent to independently training each one with the
corresponding CE loss, which is the most commonly applied
strategy on training DNN ensembles (Russakovsky et al.,
2015; Goodfellow et al., 2016). About our method, we test
two hyperparameter settings: ADP2,0 sets α = 2 and β = 0
corresponding to the case in Theorem 2, where the value of
α is chosen according to Eq. (7). This is a reference setting
to demonstrate the effect of the ensemble entropy part alone
in the ADP regularizer. ADP2,0.5 sets α = 2 and β = 0.5
corresponding to the case in Corollary 1, which is a full
version of our method. Later we may omit the subscript as
ADP to denote this setting without ambiguity.
In Table 1, we show the test error rates on each dataset. For
all the three training settings, we use the same training hy-
perparameters, e.g., learning rate, training epoch, etc. The
weight initialization is different for each network. We apply
Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with an initial learn-
ing rate of 0.001. Following similar setting as in He et al.
Table 1. Classification error rates (%) on the test set of each dataset.
The ensemble model consists of three Resnet-20 networks.
Dataset Classifier Baseline ADP2,0 ADP2,0.5
MNIST
Net 1 0.44 0.43 0.36
Net 2 0.39 0.45 0.47
Net 3 0.43 0.37 0.47
Ensemble 0.32 0.32 0.28
CIFAR-10
Net 1 8.30 9.01 9.34
Net 2 8.52 9.15 9.34
Net 3 8.67 9.14 9.92
Ensemble 6.78 6.74 6.56
CIFAR-100
Net 1 35.25 - 39.04
Net 2 35.91 - 40.86
Net 3 36.03 - 39.00
Ensemble 30.35 - 29.80
(2016), we separately run the training process for 40 epochs
on MNIST, 180 epochs on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 with
the mini-batch size of 64 on a Tesla P100 GPU worker. As
Table 1 shows, although the ADP training causes higher
error rates on individual networks, it leads to lower error
rates on the ensembles. This verifies that promoting the
ensemble diversity as defined in Eq. (3) is also effective to
improve ensemble performance in the normal setting (Krogh
& Vedelsby, 1995; Tsymbal et al., 2005). To investigate the
influence of the ADP training on the feature distributions,
we use the t-SNE method (Maaten & Hinton, 2008) to vi-
sualize the final hidden features of each network in Fig. 2.
We can see that when trained by the baseline method, the
three individual networks have learned similar feature distri-
butions. In contrast, when trained by the ADP method, the
learned feature distributions are much more different, which
makes it more difficult for adversarial examples to transfer
among individual networks as demonstrated in Section 4.4.
Furthermore, to demonstrate that the ADP method only re-
sults in a marginal increase in training time, we test the
training time per epoch with the mini-batch size of 32 on
CIFAR-10. When K = 5, it takes 204s/epoch for the base-
line method, and 227s/epoch for the ADP methods; when
K = 20, it takes 692s/epoch for baseline, and 744s/epoch
for ADP. Thus the ADP methods only increase around 10%
training time compared to baseline even when K = 20.
4.3. Performance under White-box Attacks
In the adversarial setting, there are mainly two threat mod-
els (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a): white-box adversaries know
all the information about the classifier models, including
training data, model architectures and parameters; black-box
adversaries know the classification tasks, but have no access
to the information about the classifier models.
In this sub-section, we test the performance of ensemble
models defending white-box attacks. We apply the attack
methods introduced in Section 2.2. The results are reported
in Table 2 and Table 3, where we test each attack on two
or three representative values of parameters. The iteration
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Table 2. Classification accuracy (%) on adversarial examples. Ensemble models consist of three Resnet-20. For JSMA, the perturbation
 = 0.2 on MNIST, and  = 0.1 on CIFAR-10. For EAD, the factor of L1-norm β = 0.01 on both datasets.
MNIST CIFAR-10
Attacks Para. Baseline ADP2,0 ADP2,0.5 Para. Baseline ADP2,0 ADP2,0.5
FGSM  = 0.1 78.3 95.5 96.3  = 0.02 36.5 57.4 61.7
 = 0.2 21.5 50.6 52.8  = 0.04 19.4 41.9 46.2
BIM  = 0.1 52.3 86.4 88.5  = 0.01 18.5 44.0 46.6
 = 0.15 12.2 69.5 73.6  = 0.02 6.1 28.2 31.0
PGD  = 0.1 50.7 73.4 82.8  = 0.01 23.4 43.2 48.4
 = 0.15 6.3 36.2 41.0  = 0.02 6.6 26.8 30.4
MIM  = 0.1 58.3 89.7 92.0  = 0.01 23.8 49.6 52.1
 = 0.15 16.1 73.3 77.5  = 0.02 7.4 32.3 35.9
JSMA γ = 0.3 84.0 88.0 95.0 γ = 0.05 29.5 33.0 43.5
γ = 0.6 74.0 85.0 91.0 γ = 0.1 27.5 32.0 37.0
C&W
c = 0.1 91.6 95.9 97.3 c = 0.001 71.3 76.3 80.6
c = 1.0 30.6 75.0 78.1 c = 0.01 45.2 50.3 54.9
c = 10.0 5.9 20.2 23.8 c = 0.1 18.8 19.2 25.6
EAD c = 5.0 29.8 91.3 93.4 c = 1.0 17.5 64.5 67.3
c = 10.0 7.3 87.4 89.5 c = 5.0 2.4 23.4 29.6
Table 3. Classification accuracy (%) on adversarial examples. En-
semble models consist of three Resnet-20.
CIFAR-100
Attacks Para. Baseline ADP2,0.5
BIM  = 0.005 21.6 26.1
 = 0.01 10.1 14.8
PGD  = 0.005 26.6 32.1
 = 0.01 11.7 18.3
MIM  = 0.005 24.2 29.4
 = 0.01 11.2 17.1
steps are set to be 10 for BIM, PGD, and MIM, with the step
size equals to /10. The iteration steps are set to be 1, 000
for C&W and EAD, with the learning rate of 0.01. We
separately test the ensemble models trained by the baseline,
ADP2,0 and ADP2,0.5 methods. As expected, the results
verify that our method significantly improves adversarial
robustness. However, the improvements are more prominent
on MNIST and CIFAR-10 than those on CIFAR-100. This
can be explained by Eq. (8): the non-maximal predictions
scale with the factor 1L−1 , which could result in a numerical
obstacle in the training phase when L is large. A potential
way to solve this problem is to use the temperature scal-
ing method (Guo et al., 2017), as discussed in Appendix
B.2. An interesting phenomenon is that when the LED part
is inactive as in the ADP2,0 setting, the learned ensemble
diversity is still much larger than the baseline (detailed in
Appendix B.3). This is because the ensemble entropy part
expands the feasible space of the optimal solution, while
leaving degrees of freedom on the optimal non-maximal
predictions F kj , as shown in Theorem 2. Then the ensemble
diversity is unlikely to be small in this case. However, the
existence of the LED part further explicitly encourages the
ensemble diversity, which leads to better robustness.
To show that our method is an orthogonal approach con-
cerning other defenses acting on a single network, we
test the compatibility of our method with adversarial train-
ing (AdvT), which is the most widely studied defense
Table 4. Classification accuracy (%): AdvTFGSM denotes adversar-
ial training (AdvT) on FGSM, AdvTPGD denotes AdvT on PGD.
 = 0.04 for FGSM;  = 0.02 for BIM, PGD and MIM.
CIFAR-10
Defense Methods FGSM BIM PGD MIM
AdvTFGSM 39.3 19.9 24.2 24.5
AdvTFGSM + ADP2,0.5 56.1 25.7 26.7 30.6
AdvTPGD 43.2 27.8 32.8 32.7
AdvTPGD + ADP2,0.5 52.8 34.0 36.2 38.8
method (Kurakin et al., 2018b). AdvT augments the training
data with adversarial examples in each mini-batch, where
the two quite common attacks used to craft these adver-
sarial examples are FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) and
PGD (Madry et al., 2018). In Table 4, we demonstrate the
classification accuracy of enhanced ensemble models on
CIFAR-10. We uniformly sample the perturbation  from
the interval [0.01, 0.05] when performing AdvT as in Ku-
rakin et al. (2017b). The ratio of adversarial examples and
normal ones in each mini-batch is 1:1, with the batch size
of 128. The results demonstrate that our method can further
improve robustness for ensemble models, with little extra
computation and is universal to different attacks. Besides,
when comparing the results in Table 2 and Table 4, we can
find that AdvT can also further improve the performance of
our method, which means they are indeed complementary.
4.4. Transferability among Individual Models
Due to the transferability of adversarial examples among
models (Papernot et al., 2016b), black-box adversaries can
craft adversarial examples based on substitute models and
then feed these examples to original models to perform the
attack. In this sub-section, we show that the ADP train-
ing can mitigate the transferability of adversarial examples
among the members in the ensemble, as demonstrated in
Fig. 3. For each matrix, the (i, j) element is the result of us-
ing i-th network as the substitute model to craft adversarial
examples and feeding to j-th network as the original model.
Improving Adversarial Robustness via Promoting Ensemble Diversity
Baseline
ADP
PGD (untargeted) PGD (targeted)MIM (untargeted) MIM (targeted)
Figure 3. Adversarial transferability among individual models on CIFAR-10. For untargeted attacks, the values are the classification
accuracy; For targeted attacks, those are the success rate of adversarial examples fooling classifiers to predict target classes.
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Figure 4. The ROC-curves on 1,000 test examples and 1,000 adver-
sarial examples of CIFAR-10. The model is trained by ADP2,0.5.
We apply PGD and MIM as the attack methods, which are
the two most commonly used attacks in the black-box set-
ting (Kurakin et al., 2018b). The perturbation parameters for
both attacks are set to be  = 0.05. For a complete analysis,
we test untargeted mode and targeted mode. For untargeted
mode, adversaries only aim to make the models predict
wrong labels, and the evaluation criterion is the classifica-
tion accuracy of the models on adversarial examples. For
targeted mode, the evaluation criterion becomes the success
rate of fooling the models to predict specific target label.
As the results indicate, the ADP training can significantly
alleviate the transferability among the members of the en-
sembles in both untargeted and targeted modes, which can
further lead to better robustness for the ensemble models.
4.5. Ensemble Diversity as the Detection Metric
When the adversarial perturbation becomes larger, neither
existing defenses nor our method can avoid misclassifying
on white-box adversarial examples (Athalye et al., 2018).
Then another possible solution is detecting and filtering out
adversarial examples instead (Pang et al., 2018a). In Fig. 4,
we show the ROC-curves and corresponding AUC-scores
when applying ensemble diversity as the detection metric to
filter out adversarial examples. The models are trained by
ADP2,0.5. Here the parameters used for all attacks are much
CIFAR-10
Attacks Para. Baseline ADP2,0.5
Normal - 93.6 93.8
FGSM  = 0.02 42.0 58.4
BIM  = 0.01 31.6 41.8
PGD  = 0.01 37.4 44.2
MIM  = 0.01 37.1 47.5
C&W c = 0.01 52.3 56.5
EAD c = 1.0 20.4 65.3
Table 5. Classification accuracy (%) on adversarial examples. En-
semble models consist of five Resnet-20 such that 5 - 9.
larger than those in Table 2, which can make trained models
misclassify with nearly 100% rate. The results show the
effectiveness of ensemble diversity as the detection metric
on ADP-trained models, which generalizes our method to a
more extensible defense in the adversarial setting.
4.6. The Cases ofK - (L− 1)
To further investigate the flexibility of our method, we con-
sider the cases of K - (L− 1). We test on CIFAR-10 with
L = 10 and construct an ensemble consisting of five indi-
vidual members, i.e., K = 5. It is obvious that 5 - 9. The
results are demonstrated in Table 5. We can find that even
if the condition K | (L − 1) in Corollary 1 does not hold,
the ADP training can still largely outperform the baseline
method, which suggests that our method is practically insen-
sitive to the relationship of K and L, even if L is not large,
and thus can be applied in more general cases.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose the ADP training method. Com-
pared to previous efforts that focus on enhancing a single
network, we provide an orthogonal approach to further im-
prove a practical ensemble defense, which implies that en-
semble diversity could be an important consideration to
promote when designing robust ensemble systems.
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A. Proof
We give the proofs of the theorems proposed in the paper.
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
When α = 0 and β ≥ 0, the optimization problem can be
formalized with constraints as
min
F
LECE − β · log
[
det(M˜>\yM˜\y)
]
s. t. 0 ≤ F kj ≤ 1,∑
j∈[L]
F kj = 1,
where k ∈ [K], j ∈ [L]. Note that in the objective function,
the first term LECE depends on the predictions on label y,
i.e., F ky . The second term − log
[
det(M˜>\yM˜\y)
]
depends
on the normalized non-maximal predictions F˜ k\y. Because
∀i, j, F iy and F jy are mutually independent, F iy and F˜ i\y are
also mutually independent (since the normalization), the
two terms in the objective function can separately achieve
their own minimum. Therefore, the optimal solution of
the objective function will tend to satisfies the equations
F k = 1y , where k ∈ [K].
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
When α > 0 and β = 0, the optimization problem can be
formalized with constraints as
min
F
LECE − α · H(F)
s. t. 0 ≤ F kj ≤ 1,∑
j∈[L]
F kj = 1,
where k ∈ [K], j ∈ [L]. Then the Lagrangian is
L = LECE − α · H(F) +
∑
k∈[K]
ωk(1−
∑
j∈[L]
F kj )
+
∑
k∈[K]
∑
j∈[L]
[
βk,jF
k
j + γk,j(1− F kj )
]
,
where βk,j ≤ 0, γk,j ≤ 0. The partial derivatives for F kj
are
∂L
∂F ky
= − 1
F ky
+
α
K
[1 + logFy]− ωk + βk,y − γk,y ,
∂L
∂F kj
=
α
K
[1 + logF j ]− ωk + βk,j − γk,j , ∀j 6= y.
According to the KKT conditions for the optimal solution,
we have ∀k ∈ [K], j ∈ [L],
∂L
∂F kj
= 0,
βk,jF
k
j = 0,
γk,j(1− F kj ) = 0.
Consider the optimal solutions in (0, 1)L×K , then all βk,j
and γk,j equal to zero. Now we have
− 1
F ky
+
α
K
[1 + logFy] = ωk,
α
K
[1 + logF j ] = ωk, ∀j 6= y,
and from the second equations, we can derive ∀j 6= y,
F j = exp (ωkK
α
− 1) =⇒
∑
j 6=y
F j =
∑
j 6=y
exp (
ωkK
α
− 1)
=⇒ 1−Fy = (L− 1) exp (ωkK
α
− 1)
=⇒ ωk = α
K
[
1 + log(
1−Fy
L− 1 )
]
,
and this also shows that ∀i, j 6= y, there is F i = F j =
1−Fy
L−1 . There further is ∀k ∈ [K],
1
F ky
=
α
K
log
[Fy(L− 1)
1−Fy
]
.
Thus for ∀k, l ∈ [K], F ky = F ly = Fy , and finally
1
Fy =
α
K
log
[Fy(L− 1)
1−Fy
]
.
A.3. Proof of Corollary 1
It is easy to see that the negative LED part − log(ED)
achieves its minimum if and only if the non-maximal pre-
dictions of each individual network are mutually orthogo-
nal. According to the conclusion in Theorem 2, if there
is K | (L − 1), the optimal solution in Corollary 1 can
simultaneously make the two terms of the ADP regularizer
achieve their own minimum.
B. More Analyses
In this section, we provide more details on the theoretical
and practical analyses mentioned in the paper.
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B.1. JS-divergence as the Diversity
JS-divergence among individual predictions is a potentially
plausible definition of ensemble diversity for DNNs. Specif-
ically, we consider in the output space of classifiers, where
F k represents a vector variable in RL. The JS-divergence
of K elements in F is defined as
JSD(F) = H(F)− 1
K
∑
k∈[K]
H(F k). (9)
To encourage high values of JS-divergence , we can add a
regularization term of it in the objective function. However,
when minimizing the objective function, there is neither a
closed form solution nor an intuitively reasonable solution,
as formally stated in the following theorem:
Theorem* 1. Given λ > 0, (x, y) be an input-label pair.
The minimization problem is defined as
min
F
LECE − λ · JSD . (10)
Then the problem has no solution in (0, 1)L×K .
Proof. The optimization problem can be formalized with
constraints as
min
F
LECE − λ · JSD(F)
s. t. 0 ≤ F kj ≤ 1,∑
j∈[L]
F kj = 1,
where k ∈ [K], j ∈ [L]. Then the Lagrangian is
L = LECE − λ · JSD(F) +
∑
k∈[K]
ωk(1−
∑
j∈[L]
F kj )
+
∑
k∈[K]
∑
j∈[L]
[
βk,jF
k
j + γk,j(1− F kj )
]
,
where βk,j ≤ 0, γk,j ≤ 0. The partial derivatives for F kj
are
∂L
∂F ky
= − 1
F ky
+
λ
K
[
logFy − logF ky
]− ωk + βk,y − γk,y ,
∂L
∂F kj
=
λ
K
[
logF j − logF kj
]− ωk + βk,j − γk,j , ∀j 6= y.
According to the KKT conditions for the optimal solution,
similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we can derive ∀j 6= y,
F j = F kj exp (
ωkK
λ
) =⇒
∑
j 6=y
F j =
∑
j 6=y
F kj exp (
ωkK
λ
)
=⇒ 1−Fy = (1− F ky ) exp (
ωkK
λ
)
=⇒ ωk = λ
K
log(
1−Fy
1− F ky
),
further combine with the first equation, there is
λ
K
log
[
Fy(1− F ky )
F ky (1−Fy)
]
=
1
F ky
. (11)
Since Fy = 1K
∑
k∈[K] F
k
y , Eq. (11) cannot holds for all
k ∈ [K], there is no optimal solution in (0, 1)L×K .
Therefore, it is difficult to appropriately select λ and a
balance between accuracy and diversity, which makes it
unsuitable to directly define the ensemble diversity as JS-
divergence. Note that this dilemma is mainly caused by
the second term in the definition of JS-divergence (Eq. (9))
since it can override the ECE term and lead to the wrong
prediction with a low value of the total loss.
B.2. Temperature Scaling
Guo et al. (2017) propose the temperature scaling (TS)
method to calibrate the predictions of neural networks. The
TS method simply use a temperature T > 0 on the logits,
and return the predictions as
F = S(
z
T
),
where S(·) is the softmax function, z is the logits. Usually
the temperature T is set to be 1 in the training phase, and be
larger than 1 in the test phase (Hinton et al., 2015). To solve
the numerical obstacle in the ADP training procedure when
L is large, we propose to apply the TS method in an opposite
way. Namely, in the training phase, we apply a high value of
T to increase the values of non-maximal predictions, then
in the test phase we apply T = 1 to give final predictions.
Note that the non-maximal predictions in Corollary 1 equal
to K(1−Fy)L−1 . Using the TS method is equivalent to reduceFy in the training phase. Other possible ways to solve
the numerical obstacle can be increasing the number of
members in the ensemble (increasing K) or performing a
dropout sampling in the ensemble entropy term of the ADP
regularizer (decreasing L−1). Further investigation of these
solutions is one of our future work.
B.3. Histogram of the Ensemble Diversity
To further investigate the relationship between ensemble
diversity and robustness, we plot the histogram of the loga-
rithm values of ensemble diversity on the test set of CIFAR-
10 in Fig. 5. The median values of different training meth-
ods are shown in the top-right panel. An interesting phe-
nomenon is that when the LED part is inactive as in the
ADP2,0 setting, the learned ensemble diversity is still much
larger than the baseline. This is because even though the
ensemble entropy part of ADP regularizer does not explic-
itly encourage ensemble diversity, it does expand the fea-
sible space of the optimal solution. Due to the degrees of
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Figure 5. The histogram of the ensemble diversity values on the
test set of CIFAR-10. There are totally 10,000 samples. The tiny
table shows the median values of the ensemble diversity.
freedom on the optimal individual predictions F kj in the
feasible space, the ensemble diversity is unlikely to be small.
However, the existence of the LED part further explicitly
encourage the ensemble diversity, as shown in Fig. 5.
